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Haley v. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16 (Apr. 5, 2012)1
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE – SETTLEMENT MODIFICATIONS
Summary
The Court considered a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a
district court order approving compromise of a minor’s medical practice claim, but directing a
different settlement distribution than agreed to by the parties.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court denied the writ petition in part because NRS 41.2002 authorized the district
court to adjust the allocation of settlement fees and costs in the minor’s best interest. However,
the court granted the petition in part because the district court did not explain its allocation of
fees between the minor’s attorney and guardian ad litem.
Factual and Procedural History
As a result of an emergency delivery procedure at the University Medical Center of
Southern Nevada (UMC) in June 2005, Warren West’s pregnant wife died and his daughter
Ashley was born with severe brain damage. Petitioner attorney Christopher Gellner brought
wrongful death and personal injury claims against Dr. Joel Orevillo and Stewart Pulmonary
Associates, Ltd. (SPA). When Ashley was subsequently adopted, Petitioner Dale Haley was
appointed as her guardian ad litem.
The parties reached a $283,000 settlement in July 2010. The parties submitted a
proposed compromise to the district court to approve allocation of $109,187.26 to Gellner,
$20,100 to Haley, $79,333.33 to Medicaid, and the remaining $29,379.41 to Ashley. The district
court refused to approve the compromise because the attorney allocation exceeded the amount
for the minor. After reviewing Haley’s statement of hours and Gellner’s retainer agreement, the
district court allotted $95,200 to Ashley and $63,466.67 as fees and costs to Gellner and Haley
combined.
Gellner and Haley sought the Court’s intervention by extraordinary writ, asserting the
district court lacked the statutory authority to unilaterally alter the distribution, and even if it had
such authority, the district court abused its discretion in making the alteration.
Discussion
Justice Parraguirre wrote for the unanimous three justice panel,3 noting that writ relief
was appropriate because the petitioners had no right of appeal as neither was an aggrieved party.
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NEV. REV. STAT. 41.200 (2007)(governing compromise of a minor’s claim).
3 Justice Parraguirre was joined by Justices Douglas and Hardesty.
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Further, the petition presented an issue of first impression whether a district court has authority
to unilaterally alter distribution of a settlement when approving compromise of a minor’s claim.
Petitioners argued that NRS 41.200 merely afforded the district court narrow authority to
approve a compromise in its entirety, and not to determine the amount a minor would receive.
The Court disagreed, finding that NRS 41.200 granted broad authority to approve the proposed
compromise of a minor’s claim because the approval process expressly encompassed review of
the proposed apportionment of proceeds, including the proposed allocation of attorney fees and
other expenses.4 Further, NRCP 17(c) allowed the district court to issue any order it deemed
proper to protect a minor, a rule almost identical to FRCP 17(c) charging the court with a
“special duty . . . to safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors.”5
The Court was guided by the Fourth Circuit, which concluded that “ascertaining whether
attorney fee agreements involving minors . . . are reasonable” was integral to the protective
judicial role.6 Such review necessarily entailed authority to review each portion of the proposed
compromise for reasonableness and to adjust the terms of the settlement accordingly, including
the fees and costs to be taken from the minor’s recovery.7
Next, the Court considered Ashley’s proposed compromise and reallocation of fees,
applying a “fair and reasonable” approach to review a settlement involving minors. The Court
concluded the district court acted within its broad discretion in finding the proposed allocation to
Gellner to be unreasonable. The district court had appropriately applied the Brunzell factors to
calculate the reasonableness of attorney fees.8 This analysis noted Gellner’s limited experience
as a medical malpractice attorney and highlighted his role in complicating the case with many
amended motions, dismissals and time-barred complaints due to attorney oversight. Finally, the
district court had balanced Ashley’s lifelong special needs and potential for a multimillion dollar
judgment against the proposed payment. Writ relief was therefore denied on this part.
However, the Court found the reallocation was problematic when it combined Gellner’s
and Haley’s recovery, instead of separating out the fees for the guardian ad litem, who was
statutorily entitled to reasonable compensation.9 The Court granted mandamus relief in this
respect, with the district court instructed to provide a distribution of the $63,466.67 that
reasonably accounted for the duties performed by Gellner as attorney and Haley ad guardian ad
litem.
Conclusion
NRS 41.200 authorized the district court to modify the proposed compromise in the
minor’s best interest, so redistribution of the settlement proceeds was proper. However, the
NEV. REV. STAT. 41.200(2)(f).
See Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2011).
6 In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2010).
7 Id. at 244.
8 Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969)(“(1) the qualities of the
attorney; (2) the character of the work to be done; (3) the actual work performed by the attorney; and (4) the
case’s result.”)
9 NEV. REV. STAT. 159.0455(1).
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district court should have provided an explanation as to the allocation of fees between the
attorney and guardian ad litem.

